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Abstract 
The distinctions between the rights and privileges of various categories of resident 
individuals arising from the opposing views of the conceptualisation of ‘indigeneship’, 
continue to stimulate intellectual discourses. For Nigeria, where a constant quest for 
accommodation and sense of belonging are critical to unity and stability, identity politics 
continues to engender divisions. The various cases of settler/indigene conflicts are 
indicative of the artificiality and fragility of Nigeria’s famed aesthetic unity. The paper 
focuses on prescribing solutions to the incessant identity-based conflicts prompted by 
the settler/indigene divisions and religious differences in Plateau State, Nigeria. Jos, the 
capital of Plateau State, was the centre of attraction for locals and foreigners alike, as a 
consequence of its moderate weather, cosmopolitan outlook and tendency for 
accommodating diversity. For over a decade, however, Jos and various parts of rural 
Plateau State became theatres of war. The incessant violent conflicts were instigated by 
crisscrossing distinctions over rights and privileges between the indigenous peoples and 
the settlers. With the aid of a qualitative method, a content analysis of data gathered 
from secondary sources was undertaken. In the final analysis, a three-pronged source of 
conflict can be identified in Plateau State: the individual, group and social system levels 
of interaction. In making recommendations for enduring peace, we would apply three of 
Johan Galtung’s theories on peace: ‘The Intra-personal Model’, ‘The Inter-personal 
Model’ and ‘The Intra-social Model’; to provide the platform for devising peaceful 
coexistence, stimulated through social harmony, on Nigeria’s plateau.  
 
 
Introduction 
It is evident that the segmental cleavages in Nigeria have found expression in the 
pervasive settler/indigene crises in Plateau State. The Plateau State conundrum is a 
classic reminder of the failure of the Nigerian State to engender a peaceful and 
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harmonious coexistence among the various ethnic groups on the one hand, and the 
religious groups on the other. Without an iota of doubt, the combination of ethnic 
harmony and religious tolerance is an essential ingredient for the attainment of national 
unity and integration, because of the cross-sectional character of both identity symbols in 
the Nigerian case. Conversely though, the Nigerian State appears to have accentuated 
ethnic differences by sustaining the institutionalisation of the indigene-settler dichotomy 
through poorly contrived attempts at providing equal opportunities for all groups, so that 
minority groups, in particular, may not be excluded in political representation and 
economic opportunities. The character of identity politics in Nigeria therefore allows 
ethnic conflicts to reinforce religious antagonisms and vice-versa.  
Incidentally, Plateau State appeared immune to the various ethnic and religious 
conflagrations that used to erupt in other parts of Northern Nigeria, until 2001 when ‘the 
first episode of mass violence in Jos since the anti-Igbo pogrom of 1966 occurred ...’.1 
For over a decade thereafter, Plateau State was transformed from ‘the home of peace 
and tourism’2 to an arena where deadly and barbaric tendencies were displayed.  
The analysis commences with the introduction, which is followed by the 
framework of analysis. In arriving at the three models of peace theory used as tools for 
seeking peace in Plateau State, we shall examine the concept of conflict, and indeed, its 
violent option, since this captures the Plateau State conditions. The paper concludes with 
a pragmatic application of the peace models to the Plateau State scenario. 
 
Framework of Analysis: The Conflict Paradigm 
Conflict is a constant phenomenon in the system of human interactions. It can be 
‘defined as a property of the action-system which obtains when there is no overlap 
between acceptability-region and compatibility-region’.3 It ‘refers to overt and coercive 
behaviour initiated by one contending party against another’.4 The act of conflict is 
ubiquitous and hence permeates all systems of individual and group interactions; it 
makes no distinction between formal or informal relationships, just as it is a dominant 
force in political, economic and socio-cultural relationships. Its character is of elastic 
variability, sometimes occurring as a consequence of the struggle for power, at other 
times employed to reinforce allegiances, or to either weaken or fortify the positions of 
contending parties. By nature, contending parties incur high costs, yet conflicts ‘have 
been accepted as an inevitable part of the pattern of human interactions’.5 Invariably, 
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conflict is inherent in human nature and indeed ‘the very presence of conflict is at the 
heart of all human societies’.6 
Within societies, taken here as ‘a structure and [where] the essential 
characteristics are the nature of the interaction relation and the interaction structure, not 
the nature of the individuals and sets of individuals’,7 conflict manifests itself as a group 
phenomenon. This, however, does not negate the possibilities of conflict at the individual 
level. Albeit, the unavoidable pervasiveness of group interaction results in constant group 
conflicts because of the ‘incompatibility between their goal-states’.8 The incompatible 
goal-states can be categorised into economic, value, and power differences.9 Group 
conflict behaviours are particularly dangerous to any society or political system, 
especially when it concerns the authoritative allocation of value’,10 but as Remi 
Anifowose11  opines: 
... while conflict is endemic in any political situation and all politics 
involves group conflict, … not all conflicts escalate. Although 
violence is one of its results, it is not the only action consequence 
of conflict. The latter may take a number of forms, including 
bargaining and compromise ... 
On the other hand, the escalation of group conflict could be a catalyst for such negative 
tendencies as racism, xenophobia, genocide, ethnic-cleansing, and religious bigotry.  
There is, however, a submission that the instances of group conflicts‒ as 
highlighted above ‒degenerate into violence because:  
... the parties may have (or believe that they have) incompatible 
goals, they each may have achieved high solidarity, they may have 
organised for conflict, they can mobilise their conflict resources, 
they may be hostile towards their opponents, and they may have 
sufficient material resources ...12 
In effect, inherent in violent conflict situations among groups is the interplay of intention 
to impose the will and the resistance against imposition or infringement of spaces. The 
higher the stakes, the higher the mechanism to either impose or resist, thereby allowing 
conflict situations to degenerate into violent confrontations. There is the contention that 
destructive and violent conflicts are not merely responses to ‘misperception and 
misunderstanding,13 but are the results of real differences between groups in terms of 
social power, access to resources, important life values, or other significant 
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incompatibilities’.14 They are fanned by ‘the subjective processes individuals employ in 
seeing and interpreting the world, and in how groups function in the face of differences 
and perceived threat.’15 
 
 
Violence as a Conflict Variable 
Group violence is the consequence of a besmirched political, economic and social 
order. It occurs as a result of the inability of the system to manage its processes and 
procedures to comply with minimum conflict management standards.16 Violence, either 
in its ‘direct or structural form’17 is patterned to amplify extant discontent among 
individuals or groups. Conflict should not necessarily lead to violence; its occurrence is a 
clear indication of the lack of capacity of the system. The grave consequence of group 
violent conflict is, therefore, a motivation for governments to provide measures and 
mechanisms for preventing its occurrence. Despite the various conscious integrative 
efforts, however, group violent conflicts are a recurring decimal on Nigeria’s political 
landscape. There are three complementary models that are broad enough to represent 
the causal factors of group political violence. These models are: the relative deprivation, 
rising expectations and frustration-aggression hypothesis18; the systemic hypothesis; and 
the group hypothesis.19 
The relative deprivation, rising expectations and frustration-aggression hypothesis 
lays the blame for violence on the subsisting psychological mind-set of individuals in the 
society. The submission is that a critical mass of the people are deprived of the benefits 
of basic necessities of life, and are thereby compelled to wait perpetually on the state for 
the fulfilment of the ‘social-contract’. When no reward accrues from the prolonged wait, 
the individuals become forlorn, while the risen expectations turn to frustration, and 
eventually lead to aggression. At this stage, all the symbolisms that presumably 
aggravate the deprivations suffer outright attacks. 
The systemic hypothesis focuses on the social environment as the catalyst 
inducing group violent conflict. By implication, the system’s ability to promote group 
violent conflict is real. The culpability of the system may possibly arise from the 
mismanagement of the relationships among groups, and in the process of coordinating 
rewards and benefits of belonging to the same political system. For instance, in a 
heterogeneous society, the system would provide the enabling environment for group 
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violent conflict when socio-economic benefits are unjustly and unfairly allocated among 
the groups. In other words, unless the patterns of accommodation and integration 
approaches are devoid of social marginalisation, political alienation and economic 
deprivation, the clement terrain for group violent conflict may have been laid.  
The group conflict hypothesis is relevant to the analysis of group violent conflict in 
a political system composed of a mosaic of groups with a cross-sectional character. 
Often, there is a sense of an Us/Them dichotomy among such groups, because ‘the 
major locus of political identification and socialisation has been, not the nation, but sub-
national communities with substantially different institutions, cultures and history’.20 The 
situation is even more worrisome when the groups contend for political and economic 
spoils within a confined spatial area.21 Inevitably, the conflicts among such groups result 
in ‘collective violence.22 
 
The Desirability of Peace  
The attainment of a relative state of peace is a fundamental requirement for 
societal advancement and development. Groups in any society are rarely able to coexist 
in the absence of peace. Peace, though, has multiple characterisations, and therefore, 
‘peace is an umbrella concept, it serves as the ultimate goal in very many chains of 
justification and rationalization’.23 The continuous quest for peace is, however, an 
essential element of group relations. Johan Galtung24 buttresses the position by 
asserting that: 
Since the search for peace is concerned with the relations 
between groups, it obviously divides into a negative and a positive 
part: the search for the conditions for the absence of negative 
relations, and the search for conditions that facilitate the presence 
of positive relations.  
The positive relations referred to includes, but is not limited to, the presence of 
cooperation, freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth and development, 
absence of exploitation, equality, justice, freedom of action, pluralism and dynamism.25 
Instructively, the attainment of any of these positive relations does not translate into the 
absence of conflict, but rather the existence of mechanisms to manage and prevent 
conflicts from degenerating into violent confrontations.  
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Johan Galtung’s three models of peace explain the processes through which the 
system of positive relations can be realised. These models bear direct relevance to our 
interrogation of the Plateau State conditions. They are: the intra-personal model; inter-
personal model; and the intra-social model.26 
The intra-personal model of peace is concerned with both the latent and manifest 
behaviours of individuals as members of groups in the society. In effect, the inclinations 
of individuals would inform the tendency to either embrace peace or engage in violent 
confrontations. The inter-personal model concerns the dynamics of influences 
engendered among individuals at the micro-level, while the intra-social model explicates 
the quest for peace at the macro-level‒this level of social relations subsumes all 
interactions among major groups and institutions.  
Apparently, these three theoretical viewpoints are intricately connected. The 
aggregate of individuals’ drive (either for peace or violent conflict) would form the basis 
of conditions at both the micro and macro levels of social relations. By implication, the 
quest for peace or group conflict management should focus on a tripod: positive 
nurturing of individual mindset; working the structure of interpersonal relations; and the 
quality of interpersonal relationships impacting effectively on intra-social relationships.27 
Perhaps, if the age-long held views of antagonisms between the indigenes and the 
settlers in Plateau State had been settled through mutually beneficial relationships, the 
drive for violent conflicts may not have arisen. 
 
Plateau State as an Ethnic Mosaic 
The current geographical delineation of Plateau State is a result of the state-
creation exercises undertaken by erstwhile military administrations. The first of such 
exercises was the creation of the Benue-Plateau State from the broader Northern Region 
in 1967. This was followed by the creation of Plateau State in 1976, and the last 
adjustment was made in 1996 when the existing Nasarawa State was extracted from the 
former Plateau State.  
The present Plateau State is composed of approximately 3.2 million people.28 The 
majority of residents in Plateau State are from the indigenous groups, which include the 
influential groups of Berom, Afuzere and Anaguta (BAA). There are also the less 
influential indigenous groups, such as Piapung, Buji and Chip, among others. The second 
category of residents in Plateau State is the various settler groups, comprising of ethnic 
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groups from all the other geo-political zones in Nigeria. The Hausa-Fulani people from the 
northern part of the country are the most populous and influential set of migrants, while 
the other groups from the south, which include the Ibo, Yoruba, and Efik groups, are 
relatively reticent.  
Within Plateau State, Jos (the capital city) holds the greatest attraction for 
migrants. The allure of Jos to non-natives was inspired by the opportunities created by 
the budding tin-mining industry of the early twentieth century. According to Africa 
Report,29 ‘Nigerians from across the country as well as a sizeable number of Europeans 
were attracted to the then famous Jos industrial-scale tin and columbite mines between 
1904 and the 1980s’. While the influx of southerners to Plateau State, mainly Jos, is a 
twentieth century development and a fall-out of the industrial development, the Hausa-
Fulani relationship with Plateau State dates back to the pre-colonial era, and subsists till 
today.  
The Hausa-Fulani group’s interest in settling in Plateau State commenced before 
the creation of Jos in 1915.30 It began with the incursion of the Jihadist movement 
around the mountains surrounding the Jos Plateau in the 19th century. The incursion 
was, however, resisted by the natives who held on to their beliefs in the various 
traditional African deities. The people later embraced Christianity when the first set of 
Christian missionaries gained access to the rural Plateau.31 The futile attempt through 
religious incursion did not dissuade the Hausa group from settling in Plateau State 
through other means. As pastoralists, their cattle grazed along the Plateau planes, hence 
the need to set-up shelters along the route. During this period, today’s rural Plateau 
played host to the Hausa-Fulani herdsmen who proudly practised their Islamic religion.32 
Accordingly,  
Muslims established more settlements and had a more extensive 
presence in the lowlands than on the high plateau – at least going 
back to the nineteenth century in Wase, and perhaps earlier in 
Kanam, the two emirates within Plateau State.33 
The economic development of Jos in the twentieth century attracted more Hausa-Fulani-
speaking people to the area, such that they enjoyed population preponderance over 
other settler groups in Jos. It turned out that in the early twentieth century, the Jos area 
was dominated by migrants, the majority of whom were the Hausa-Fulani, while the 
indigenes made up less than two per cent of the city’s population.34 
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 Ambe-Uva’s35 description of the features of Plateau State provides justification for 
the state’s reputation as a haven for settlers. According to the author, ‘the high fertility 
rate of the land’ coupled with ‘the near temperate climatic conditions’, ‘availability of 
water and the absence of livestock threatening diseases’, encouraged farming and 
livestock rearing respectively. Furthermore, the temperate climate also boosted tourism, 
especially European presence. Lastly, the facilitation of commerce through the various 
modes of transportation – road, rail and air – all added to the allure of Plateau State, 
and Jos in particular.  
 Plateau State thus emerged as the epicentre of Nigeria’s heterogeneity. Located 
approximately in the middle of Nigeria, it is one of the six states in the North-central geo-
political zone, which also includes the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. By implication, the 
presence of the various ethnic groups in substantial numbers is indicative of a multi-
religious setting in Plateau State. While the majority of the indigenes are Christians, the 
majority settler group is made up of Muslims. The settler groups from the South are 
mainly Christians, except for a minority Muslim population from the Yoruba-speaking 
areas. Plateau State therefore represents an interlocking web of ethno-religious diversity.  
With the emergent character of Jos and rural Plateau, it was apparent that only 
the drive for accommodation and tolerance could sustain the peaceful and harmonious 
coexistence that made Plateau State a destination of choice for several decades. Though 
the first set of cracks were experienced in 1994, the process of shattering the seeming 
relative peace and tolerance erupted in 2001, and the process of turning Plateau State 
into a horrific mine-field continued with the crises of 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.  
 
 
The Content and Context of Violent Conflicts in Plateau State 
The Plateau State’s perennial conflict is an offshoot of the indigene-settler 
antagonism that bedevils Nigeria. It emanated from clashes between the recognised 
indigenous groups and a segment of the settler groups, while the members of the various 
less populous and less dominant settler groups have become victims of circumstance. 
The violent conflict is the reaction of the belligerent groups to the complex nature of 
identity-based relations in Plateau State. The challenge is further compounded by the 
ambiguous characterisation of the indigene status by the political class, since there are 
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no constitutional provisions that explicitly define an indigene of Nigeria, despite 
according reverential recognition to indigenes in political appointments. According to 
Section 147 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: 
 ... the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each 
State, who shall be an indigene of such State.36 
 
Since the definition of the indigene label is largely at the discretion of state and local 
government authorities, there continues to be flagrant abuse that has ‘fostered deep 
socio-economic inequalities, given that indigenes enjoy preferential access to land, 
schools, development spending and public jobs’.37 Unfortunately, the indigene-settler 
debacle is worsened by the exhibited intolerance of religious differences. Rothman38 
opines that: ‘When people’s essential identities, as expressed and maintained by their 
primary group affiliations, are threatened or frustrated, intransigent conflict almost 
inevitably follows.’ A critical assessment of the Plateau State condition through a conflict 
analysis method would provide an exposition of the origin, dimensions and possible 
solutions to the Plateau State imbroglio.  
 
 
Conflict Actors 
The actors in the conflict can be divided into two broad groups. On one side are 
the indigenous groups made up of Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, Amo, Buchi, and Challa, 
among others. The combined effort of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta is, however, the 
most prominent in wresting the soul of Plateau from the ‘supposed’ intrusive settlers. 
The opposing side is the settler group made up mainly of the Hausa-Fulani group of 
Northern Nigeria. The other segment of the settler group (those from Southern Nigeria) is 
not reported to be in conflict with the indigenes. This is understandable. For one, the 
migrants from the south, namely the Ibo-, Yoruba-, Efik- and Ijaw-speaking peoples, 
among others, have never been in contention for political offices with the indigenes. This 
is coupled with the fact that their basis for migrating to Jos was to tap into the economic 
potential of the city. Perhaps the most important factor is the fact that the majority of the 
migrants from the South are Christians (except for a negligible number of Yoruba-
speaking people who are Muslims). This is a most critical factor in identity-driven 
conflicts based on the fact of multiple identities for each individual whose discretion it is 
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to acknowledge the most important as dictated by extant situational demands. On many 
occasions during the various violent confrontations, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani have 
attacked their migrant co-travellers from the South, who are often grouped in the same 
category as Plateau State indigenes as enemies because of the difference in religious 
beliefs with the former and commonality with the latter.  
 
Conflict Causes: Structural/Root and Proximate  
The eruption of violent conflicts in Plateau State after Nigeria’s attainment of 
democratic status in 1999, is a result of deep-seated acrimony that has historical roots 
in the veiled politics of exclusion that defines the visible ethno-religious entanglements of 
the state. The conflict situation in the state is a concomitant of the ‘political exclusion on 
the basis of ethnicity and religion on the Muslim side, and the fears of religious and 
cultural domination, among Plateau Christians’.39 The indigenous Plateau people are 
mindful of the overbearing influences of the Hausa group on their ethnic identity, 
religious beliefs and socio-political and economic advancement. While it took sheer 
determination to ward off the Jihadist incursion into Plateau in the nineteenth century, 
the same level of resistance could not be applied when Plateau was placed under the 
political and administrative control of the Bauchi Emirate by the British colonialists 
during the period of the Indirect Rule System.40 
The domination of the Hausa-Fulani people over the indigenous Plateau groups 
extends to the economic arena. In the aftermath of the creation of Jos, the Hausa-Fulani 
group flooded the city and dominated the commercial activities of the area, becoming 
the most populous group in Jos North. In turn, this situation gave weight to their demand 
for, and creation of, a local government area. Also, in contemporary geo-strategic 
consideration, Plateau State falls under the North-central geo-political zone, thereby 
becoming a minority group under the majority of the very influential Hausa-Fulani-
speaking people of Northern Nigeria.  
The above conditions are a constant source of paranoia among the indigenes 
about the possibility of the Hausa-Fulani group riding roughshod over them on their 
territory. The return to democratic rule in 1999 presented an avenue for the indigenes to 
exert their dominance through the capture of political offices and invariably reduced the 
presumed overbearing influences of the Hausa-Fulani group. The indigenous groups 
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exploited the opportunity by taking control of the various levels of government, except for 
a few positions that were not considered strategic.  
The emergent dynamics of political and social interactions within the state 
became tense, for while the indigenes were content with taking charge of political control 
of the state, the Hausa-Fulani settlers resisted the drastic transformation that would 
reduce their ability to remain relevant in the high politics of Plateau State. In effect, the 
violent conflicts erupted because of the Hausa-Fulani group’s resistance to both 
anticipated and real ‘marginalisation’, and the indigenes’ unapologetic stance on taking 
over political control of Jos and the whole of Plateau State. The exclusionist’s tendencies 
of the BAA group were openly exhibited on various occasions, while the Hausa-Fulani 
group’s uncharacteristic manner of contending for liberty and equality is legendary. It is 
worrisome that the politics of exclusion in Nigeria is given an immense boost through the 
jaundiced application of the ambiguous ‘indigene’ concept. In all cases, the application 
of the indigene rule short changes those regarded as non-indigenes or settlers.  
 In the final analysis, the mutual mistrust occasioned by the newly acquired 
political might of the indigenes against the survivalist instincts of the Hausa-Fulani, 
cascaded into outright violent conflicts through specific triggers, fierce political 
contestations and religious intolerance. 
 
Conflict Triggers/Drivers  
 There have been several cases of eruption of violent conflict in Plateau State 
since 2001. They may have been characterised by distinct scenarios, yet they were all 
triggered by similar broad factors. These factors have been grouped into ‘competing 
historical interpretation and political claims; the creation of Jos North LGA; citizenship 
and indigene rights; rural land conflicts; regional influences; and the religious 
dimension’.41 In effect, the common denominator is the interplay of political 
contestations (especially in Jos) and economic struggle (especially in rural Plateau State), 
which are used to accentuate the other differences in society‒specifically religious and 
ethnic differences‒to foster a reign of fierce and deadly antagonisms that have left a 
once vibrant multicultural and multi-religious society debased and emasculated.  
The claim to the ownership of Jos is one of the major sore points in the 
relationship between the indigenous BAA group and the Hausa-Fulani group. The struggle 
for the soul of the city is not unconnected to its strategic importance in the development 
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of Plateau State as a whole. The Hausa-Fulani argue that Jos was virgin land, discovered 
by them and transformed into a modern cosmopolitan city as a result of their 
resourcefulness. The Hausa-Fulani position further states that the indigenes and 
migrants from the South became attracted to the allure of Jos after they (the Hausa-
Fulani) had turned the land into a city. To this end, ‘Jos grew as a town of migrants who 
arrived there from all parts of Nigeria’.42 
Though the BAA group does not contest the discovery of Jos by the Hausa-
speaking people, the indigenes claim that since Jos is part of Plateau State, the Hausa-
speaking people remain settlers, and therefore do not possess rights over Jos. The 
potential for conflict over the ownership of Jos informed the creation of Jos North Local 
Government Area in 1991 under the military government of General Babangida. The 
move was meant to give the majority Hausa-Fulani people a sense of belonging in that 
part of Plateau State. Understandably, the BAA group was infuriated by the development, 
which meant that they became a minority group in the Jos North Local Government Area, 
and their consequent protest caused the position of Chairman of the local government to 
remain under perpetual disputation. The dawn of democracy created the opportunity to 
again contest the political leadership of Jos North Local Government Area. The Hausa-
Fulani group was determined to reclaim power in an area it regards as its base, while the 
BAA group’s anxiety to take political control of the area exacerbated violent 
confrontations. 
 The other important trigger to the conflict is the antagonistic relationship between 
the BAA people and the Hausa-Fulani cattle owners, whose cattle grazing activities in 
rural Plateau reportedly cause devastation to the farm lands. This has led to the seizure 
of cattle, in addition to the invasion of the Hausa-Fulani homes by the affected 
indigenous rural dwellers. The Hausa-Fulani people have equally reacted through counter 
attacks on churches and dawn raids on the homes of the indigenes in the locality. 
Another important conflict trigger is the depressed economic circumstances of the 
critical mass of the people. The condition of the masses in Plateau State is a reflection of 
the growing and deepening poverty in the country as a whole. Growing youth 
unemployment is at the highest, which makes for a restive youth population. A large 
percentage of the youth are unemployed and easily available, which makes them ready 
tools in the hands of members of the political class seeking offices in government 
through the use of identity-driven devises. The negative tales of ethnic and religious 
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sentiments trigger the reaction to occupy the streets and unleash mayhem across ethnic 
and religious lines.  
The triggers are fundamentally driven by the contending groups’ quest for power. 
As Coleman43 notes: ‘Most conflicts directly or indirectly concern power, either as 
leverage for achieving one’s goals, as a means of seeking or maintaining the balance or 
imbalance of power in a relationship, or as a symbolic expression of one’s identity.’ 
 
Conflicts and Conflict Aggravators  
The prelude to the post-1999 era violent conflicts in Plateau State has been 
traced to the violent clashes of 1994.44 The clash between the BAA and the Hausa-Fulani 
groups led to the death of a number of people and the destruction of property.45 The 
stage was then set for future conflicts, because it became clear that despite the 
numerical preponderance of the Hausa-Fulani group in Jos North Local Government Area, 
the BAA group would not tolerate the Hausa-Fulani political leadership of the area. 
The 2001 clash was the first full-blown crisis since the display of mutual suspicion 
between the indigenes and settlers in Plateau State. Much like the 1994 incident, it was 
caused by the appointment of Mukhtar Muhammed as the coordinator of the National 
Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). The BAA communities rejected the appointment 
of a Hausa-Fulani Muslim to such a highly placed government position, and were bent on 
overturning the appointment.46 With the pent-up anger generated over the appointment 
episode, tension increased in the area and the people retreated into identity cleavages. It 
was only a matter of time, however, before the Hausa claimed provocation. This 
happened when a female Christian was accused of trespassing, because she walked 
through a barricaded street leading to the mosque during Friday prayers.47 The clash that 
emanated from that provocation resulted in the death of over a thousand people and the 
destruction of property worth millions in naira.48 
A similar scenario was recorded in April 2002 during the ward election in the 
Naraguta community, Jos North Local Government Area.49 The result of the elections did 
not favour the candidate of the indigenous Berom group, and therefore a rejection of the 
results was exhibited through attacks on the opposition party members, who were mainly 
the Hausa-Fulani group. The notion is affirmed that both cases of alleged irregularities in 
elections and the denial of rights to participate in the electoral contest, would lead to a 
violent conflict situation in an area contending with identity politics.50 The Hausa-Fulani 
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group responded to the development with violence that led to a loss of human lives and 
the destruction of property.  
The desire for political domination also account for the 2004 crisis in the town 
Yelwa, Shendam.51 As during the previous crises, thousands of people were killed, 
property worth millions in naira was destroyed and places of worship were torched. The 
wanton killings and destruction of property warranted the declaration of a state of 
emergency in Plateau State by the Federal Government. This was meant to allow a 
neutral Federal Government-appointed team to take charge of the machinery of 
government in the state for six months, a time presumed to be sufficient for normality to 
return to the state. 
The emergency rule did not dissuade the antagonists from engaging in violent 
conflicts some four years later. In 2008, another large-scale crisis erupted after the 
election in Jos North Local Government produced a controversial result, which gave the 
victory of the election to an indigene who observers had alleged had been trailing the 
defeated candidate of the settlers with 26 000 votes at some point.52 The reaction of the 
Hausa-Fulani group to the election result was a direct assault on the non-Hausa-Fulani 
populace, but the indigenous groups responded in equal measure, leading to thousands 
of deaths and loss of property on both sides.  
The 2010 trend changed slightly from the earlier occurrences. Towards the end of 
the year 2010, the bombing method that had become regular in parts of Nigeria’s 
Northern zone was activated in turns in various parts of Jos. According to reports, 
multiple blasts rocked the metropolis on Christmas Eve, killing thirty-two people, while 
seventy-four others were hospitalised.53 
According to International Crisis Group,54 ‘2011 was a particularly bloody year’. 
Clashes leading to killings, and reprisal killings, became the order of the day. The year 
also recorded the killings of high-profile political figures, namely Senator Ayang Dantong 
and Honourable Gyang Fulani.55 The dangerous trend of the crisis led once again to the 
direct intervention of the Federal Government. Accordingly, a 24-hour curfew was 
imposed on Barkin-Ladi, in addition to the declaration of a state of emergency in four 
local governments: Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Ryiom.56 Unfortunately, but 
quite expectedly, the hasty decisions and half measures of the Federal Government did 
not produce the desired results. 
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The year 2013 was equally regaled with its dose of violent conflicts. On 30 March 
2013, Wase Local Government Area provided the terrain for the crisis between the Tarok 
people and Fulani herdsmen that led to the death of 35 people.57 The National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that between March and mid-April 
2013, 135 people had died and 12 051 people had been displaced in a series of 
clashes in north-central Plateau State.58 
Following in the tradition of sporadic violence, the year 2014 also recorded cases 
of ethno-religious violence in Plateau State. In August of that year, there were reported 
cases of deadly midnight attacks on the residents of Jalin village, Jos East Local 
Government Area, and the Fulani community of Yelwanshendam, in Southern Plateau. In 
addition to the deadly attacks on humans, was the ‘rustling’ of more than a hundred 
cows.59 
Similarly in July 2015, two bomb explosions occurred on the premises of both a 
mosque and a restaurant, leading to the death of 42 people. In apparent retaliatory 
attacks, two churches were torched to revenge the detonation of explosives at the 
mosque. Under the circumstances, the Plateau State Governor formally requested the 
Federal Government to restore the various checkpoints that were a part of everyday 
living in Plateau State.60 
 
Conflict Inhibitors (Responses) 
 The persistent cases of violent conflicts in Plateau State and the long-term 
implications for national cohesion must have informed the Federal Government’s direct 
intervention in efforts towards ending the violent conflicts. Thus, in order to stem the tide 
of flagrant disregard for law and order, and nip the incidences of violent conflicts in the 
bud, the Federal Government has responded to the situation through a variety of 
measures. These responses include the fortification of the security apparatuses in the 
state, the imposition of emergency rule and the setting-up of commissions of inquiry. 
 As the various outbreaks of violent conflicts in Plateau State further exposed the 
inability of the Nigeria Police Force to maintain law and order, the Federal Government 
reacted to the security situation in the past by fortifying the state security process with 
the setting-up of the Special Task Force, recently renamed ‘Operation Safe Haven’. In 
reality, the involvement of the military has been significant in limiting the spate of 
violence; however, the end of the military engagement and subsequent withdrawal, partly 
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provide the avenue for the renewal of confrontations. In effect, the role of the Special 
Task Force has been episodic, so that periods of success are short-lived. The overall 
assessment of the situation in Plateau State is that the Nigeria Police institution has not 
provided the requisite security for the people. 
As mentioned earlier, the 2004 violent conflict in Plateau State led to loss of lives 
and wanton destruction of property. The glaring inability of the state government to 
enforce law and order propelled the Obasanjo administration, acting under Section 305 
(1) of the 1999 Constitution,61 to impose and declare emergency rule in the state, 
thereby preventing all democratically elected officials from performing their public 
functions for six months. In their place, retired General Chris Ali was appointed as the 
Administrator of the State, and expected to ensure the return of peace to Plateau State 
within a period of six months. Indeed, peace reigned for this period, but Plateau State 
eventually reverted to its violent past. Similarly, the solution to the outbreak of violence 
in 2011 also involved the declaration of a state of emergency by the Jonathan 
administration, but shortly after it was called off, the belligerents re-emerged from their 
tents and continued the assaults against one another. The lesson here is that the violent 
conflicts in Plateau State have defied hasty and ill-advised solutions.  
Another remarkable response from both the Federal and Plateau State 
governments has been the inauguration of commissions of inquiry whose terms of 
reference are usually to highlight the causal factors of crises, identify perpetrators, and 
present suggestions on how to tackle the problems. Some of these are the Justice Niki 
Tobi, Justice Felicia Dusu and Justice Bola Ajibola Commissions of Inquiry. A most 
common complaint among commentators on the Plateau State situation is that the 
government never implements the recommendations of the commissions of inquiry.62 
This, perhaps, informed the refusal of the Hausa-Fulani representatives to participate in 
the sitting of the last commission of inquiry. Unfortunately, the works of the various 
commissions of inquiry have not hindered the perpetrators, neither have they solved the 
problems of Plateau State.  
A retrospective assessment of the various measures initiated by the Federal 
Government explains the reasons why the crisis continues unabated. The measures have 
merely been stopgaps, and not actions that were carried through on the basis of well 
devised mechanisms and processes for placating the stakeholders –being just and fair, 
and being perceived to be just and fair. As shown in the Plateau State case, the negative 
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effects of identity-based relations must be systematically extracted from the processes of 
acquisition and retention of political power. The solution lies in the creation of a peace 
process ensconced in the interpersonal and inter-group relationships of the people of 
Plateau State – indigenes and settlers alike. 
 
Conclusions: A Working Peace Process for Nigeria’s Plateau 
 The growth and development of any society hinges on enduring peace and 
harmony among the various groups that cohabit. As already exemplified by the Plateau 
State experience, the attainment of peace within societies characterised by ethnic and 
religious diversity is a process that must be solidly built on mutual trust, respect, 
tolerance and understanding. It is definitely not attainable through the works of one-off 
and ad-hoc committees, neither is it possible through the use of force. In effect, the 
attainment of sustainable peace and harmony in Plateau State must be erected on 
concrete political and socio-psychological measures that must de-emphasise the 
importance of ethnic and religious identities in issues of political and economic 
development.  
Having identified the inconsistent interpretation of some sections of Nigeria’s 
constitution as one of the factors fanning the embers of group antagonisms, it is 
essential to revisit the constitution and effect fundamental changes. This onerous task 
was undertaken by the National Assembly under the Jonathan administration. The 
constitution amendment processes at the time showed that the majority of Nigerians 
clamoured for the obliteration of all clauses that may aid the deepening of the 
complexities of the indigene question. As discovered from the constitutional amendment 
exercise, Nigerians are desirous of deeper integration within their societies. There is no 
more eloquent testament to the desire for integration of groups within Nigeria than the 
‘YES’ answer provided by the majority of respondents in the constitutional amendments 
exercise to the question: ‘Should indigeneship of an area be defined to include persons 
who have resided in an area for a continuous long period, and therefore, entitled to 
accruing rights, duties, and privileges?’63 
 Nigerians must, however, be mindful of the fact that an amendment of the 
constitution cannot singularly guarantee a lasting solution to politically driven identity-
based problems, either in Plateau State or elsewhere, in the country. An analysis of this 
route would show that, even if the sections glorifying ethnicity-based political relations 
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are expunged from the constitution, and the settler-indigene question is resolved, the 
other significant line of identity (religious identity) would remain a divisive force, despite 
the emphasis on the religious secularity of the Nigerian State in the constitution.64 In 
effect, stakeholders must coalesce to initiate and implement a broad-based peace plan 
in order to bring the objectives of an amended constitution to fruition in Plateau State 
and elsewhere in the country. 
The fundamental objective of the peace plan must be the establishment of a 
mechanism for the resurgence of a sense of accommodation and tolerance within 
Plateau State. The mechanism must focus on the transformation of people’s negative 
stereotypical perceptions of one another, such that enmity can turn to good 
neighbourliness. The mechanism would also provide the platform for the principles of 
fairness, equity and justice to be held sacrosanct in the allocation of values. These tasks 
are people-focussed, and must, therefore, work on the psyche of an already battered and 
disgruntled people.  
Plateau State can provide a practical expression for Johan Galtung’s65 models of 
the peace process in the attempt to initiate and implement a people-focussed agenda for 
enduring peace. Since identity conflicts, such as that of Plateau State, are rooted ‘in 
complex and multidimensional psychological, historical, and cultural factors’,66 the first 
port of call for solutions must be a focus on the psychological mind-sets of individual 
actors. The intra-personal model which is ‘concerned with personality structure, with 
what is filled into the individuals’,67 therefore has direct relevance to efforts geared 
towards the renewal of the mindset of individuals in Plateau State. This is even more so, 
because the Plateau State conflict falls within the class of those ‘intangible and hard to 
define conflicts, because they arise from the depths of the human heart rather than the 
material world’.68 
Based on the experiences of over a decade of long and bitter conflicts, the 
initiation of a high-quality re-orientation programme, focussed specifically on the 
fundamentals of tolerance and accommodation, and the positives that can be derived 
from interpersonal relationships, should be the focus of governments. Understandably, 
there exists biases along identity lines; thus, a peace-process must fundamentally 
address the issue of accommodation and tolerance, so that the two antagonistic 
religious faiths in Plateau State can build an overarching, collaborative relationship, that 
would transcend religious beliefs, and would embrace the sense of common humanity. 
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Similarly, the ethnic cleavages must be smoothened to allow for strong inter-ethnic 
interactions, along cultural, economic and professional lines. The various ethnic 
organisations must submit to a broad-based, high-powered, inter-ethnic group, that 
should be responsible for coordinating inter-ethnic relations. These processes can only 
be achieved when the thinking of individuals have been directed away from the Us/Them 
dichotomy and swayed to focus on the ideals of common humanity. 
A positive intra-personal mind-set would encourage the birth of a positive inter-
personal relationship across the society. The inter-personal model is ‘concerned with how 
relations between individuals at the micro-level are structured’.69 In the case of Plateau 
State, there is the need to rebuild the relationships soiled by the more than a decade-
long crisis of identity, fomented by the desire for public office. Specifically, the various 
streets/area blockades, campaigns of calumny, propaganda, and all similar activities 
that often inflame the emotions of the groups, should be systematically dismantled, so 
that a platform for the realignment of common societal goals can be created. Invariably, 
the renewed intra-personal mind-set should ginger the possibilities of renewed inter-
personal relationships. 
Finally, the intra-social model is one ‘that deals with the macro-level of social 
relations, particularly with the relations between major groups and institutions’.70 Since 
individual and group relations make up social relations, the micro level of interaction 
defines the character of relations at the macro level of social interactions. It needs no 
further reiteration that the various ethnic and religious groups can be assured of 
peaceful and harmonious relations at the macro levels as long as the relationships at the 
personal and group levels of relations are peaceful and harmonious. Plateau State 
deserves a renaissance.  
 It is essential that Plateau State, and other states in the country with similar 
circumstances, redress their situations by forming solid bases and foundations that 
would withstand the weight of conflict without resort to violence. The sub-units of a 
relatively humongous heterogeneous state like Nigeria have no option but to seek 
panacea to conflicts without recourse to violence. 
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